Iconic Remembering and Religious Icons:
Fundamentalist Strategies in European Memory Politics?[1]

I will only present some preliminary thoughts on the issue of "European Remembrance" here. These thoughts concern especially two developments: On the one hand, and rather retrospective, national as well as European forms of collective remembrance after 1989 – conventional formats, so to speak; on the other hand, newer tendencies of a globalization and fundamentalization in memory politics. In the past few years, these tendencies have also come from within Europe. And they become visible in new cultural formats, often in religious ones. – This at least is my impression and my hypothesis: We are dealing here with a new and fundamental "iconic turn" in visual politics, in politics of imagery. – A turn that in terms of mnemotechnics creates new situations – and that partially relates to the advance of Islamist as well as Christian visual politics in Europe.

I.

Just to be clear: Against the background of European history we have so far researched collective memory and collective politics of remembrance primarily in a national perspective. – Quite reasonably, since in Europe "national remembrance" embodied without doubt the prototype of all those enterprises of identity politics, which from the late 18th century up until the present have sketched collective images of selfhood.[2] Images, on the one hand, of national and ethnic communities, which had to seem historically plausible and culturally attractive. – And on the other hand, images which were supposed to have two effects at once: An inward politics of integration and an outward politics of difference.

The reason is that national identity politics meant the attempt of an inner collectivization, which essentially depended on its "relation", on the existence of external concepts of the enemy and scenarios of threat. And it necessitated a clear-cut opposition of "self" and "other". Normally, they produced this differentiation along cultural attributes, which then

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[1] Translated by Fred von Bose.
[2] Cf. Pierre Nora [ed.]: Les lieux de mémoire. Paris.

were being essentialized: lineage, language, religion, mentality. – National and ethnic collectivization in a Weberian sense was thus accomplished primarily via culturalist strategies and formats, which could always be modified and newly adjusted. Here the ability to draw boundaries was of essential importance: Within society against the culturally foreign, at the national borders against foreign society and power.

With Georg Simmel we know that this boundary paradigm has been a momentous idea specifically for Europe: the moral legitimation and cultural conceptualization of "difference".[3] Until the day of today we therefore have difficulties with thinking specific concepts of the social and of social order in a literally border-less way. Border mentalities seem to disappear much slower than border guards.

On the one hand, these national memories of the late 19th and early 20th century have always been layered with columns and arches of a European culture of remembrance, which always referred to traditions of "high culture": from the humanities to literature and the arts to music – and from antiquity to the present. And the European elites always proved to be committed to this project of "Christian-occidental civilization". Because this way they helped shaping this Europe with its social orders as well as its historical imagery. And as engineers of its identity they invented it through their political, scientific as well as artistic practices time and again. – In changing narratives and imagery, thus in identity constructions by means of which they could legitimate anew their own relevance and secure their position of power. On the other hand, the elites remained to be primarily national actors. Thereby they provided for the existence of steady national orders as well as firm ethnic and religious social structures. This way the nation represented all in once: It was a community of lineage as well as of maintenance, a community of defense as well as of values.

European offerings of identity therefore could never compete with the national ones in the sense of material or idealistic attractiveness. Without own economic power, without being able to offer social welfare and without the potential for militaristic-imperial capacity, Europe remained to be just a weak vision for the social majorities, in a political as well as emotional sense. Along with this visionary weakness there necessarily also

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[3] Georg Simmel: Soziologie des Raumes. In: Ders.: Schriften zur Soziologie. Frankfurt am Main 1983, pp. 221-241.

went a commemorative weakness: It clearly was the national power of remembrance that until far into the postwar period also dominated and structured the respective horizon of European landscapes of remembrance.

At this point, this postwar period appears to lose its validity as a mnemotechnical arrangement. Also the political balance of power seems to slowly shift from the national to the European since the past few years. The Europeanization of Europe by the European Union of course plays a central role in this context. It is especially the concentration of material resources and political competences with the authorities in Brussels, which effectively changes the strategic framework.[4] – We now appear to be able to think in new ways about national identity politics as European structural policy.

For that purpose there have to be accomplished some fundamental symbolic reinterpretations – especially in the realm of social perception and historical remembrance. In this sense it is the "European topoi" of remembrance that now gain importance: dates, names, places, regions, artworks, values – usually assigned with specific cultural associations and meanings. European memory is thus being organized and constructed in a "culturalistic" way.[5] – A more detailed analysis of European cultural awards, of exhibitions, contests and especially of recent cultural events in the arts, music, in literature and the media would easily prove this proposition. This cultural Europeanization of course profits from the fact that Europe can profile itself in the context of globalization as a still clearer and more accessible horizon. It constructs itself as offering the charm of the close-by, of the local. And it appears to still offer hold and security against the superiority of the "big world": European culture thus as "home", "Heimat".

Vis-à-vis this Europeanization, on the other hand, there still insistently stands the national idea that points to an own "Germanness", "Britishness" or "Italianess". – But in a new way and not without finesse: Meanwhile national actors themselves succeed to denunciate this Europeanization as a form of globalization. In their narratives, their notion of the national then appears vice versa as that of "the local": as the culturally

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[4] Cris Shore: Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London 2000.
[5] Aleida Assmann: Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses. München 1999.

"really" authentic and own, which itself requires protection and appreciation: protection against Europe by Europe – paid for by Brussels.

Especially Western European member states have exercised this strategy over the past decades – and Eastern European accession countries have followed this example in the past years – last but not least due to intense "mnemopolitical labor". It is regarding the latter where, on the one hand, pre-socialist traditions and symbols are being again pushed to the fore and re-arranged as national myths: history narratives, king crowns, rulers' bones and hymns. On the other hand these life worlds (*Lebenswelten*) are being saturated with new national and ethnic symbolism. For example, in Hungary land property is being announced as sanctuary; in Poland we currently encounter this tendency in discussions on energy; in Czech Republic and Slovakia it is the respective mutual dissociation in all public realms, from politics to sports.

These messages, brought across as necessary "re-nationalizations", prove to be extremely powerful. It is through their motives and imagery that social bonds are being strengthened and political loyalties are being activated anew.[6] A crucial contribution to this is a new "aestheticization" of the national. From film to video clip, from pop music to cultural events, from cell phone- to Internet communication: there are constantly being developed new media and performative patterns of the construction of "collective memory". – Patterns and styles that aesthetically appeal especially also to younger people. They are thhereby handed on a national pathos whose purpose is twofold: to create a new form of patriotism on the one hand, and to stop moderately appearing as "Second class Europeans" on the other. Instead, they much rather want to henceforth become the "New Europe" indeed.

In Western Europe, however, there has begun a slightly different development: a politics of remembrance with stronger reflexive tendencies – questioning just this national pathos of "lieux de mémoire" and of cultures of remembrance. Recently, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has not without irony commented upon British politics of remembrance as follows: "Gestures of penitence with regards to British mischief have cumulated. Tony Blair has apologized for the failure of the British during the Irish

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[6] cf. Beate Binder / Wolfgang Kaschuba / Peter Niedermüller [eds.]: Inszenierung des Nationalen. Geschichte, Kultur und die Politik der Identitäten am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Köln 2001.

famine; his government is currently debating about a "declaration of regret" on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in next spring. The Queen has apologized to the Maori for the deprivation of land in the 19th century, as well as to the Indians for the 1919 Amritsar-massacre. Now she has, together with Prince Philip, attended the unveiling of a memorial for the sachem Mahomet of the Mohegan tribe, who protested against British deprivation of land in London in 1735, but who never actually advanced to George II. because he soon had died from pox."[7]

Yet also the German debates on remembrance demonstrate a heightened potential for reflexivity: as for example those about the design of the various Holocaust memorials in Berlin, or about the painful corrections of the German self-perception by the much attended to exhibition about the German Wehrmacht during the second world war. – The contemporary Europeanization of the concept of "lieux de mémoire" also clearly points to this direction.

II.
These few remarks were intended to somewhat help outline the horizon of the hitherto existing politics of remembrance – just unsystematically and roughly. On this basis I would now like to put forth a few thoughts about new developments of cultures of remembrance and memory politics. Thereby new formats seem to increasingly play a role, which diverge from the tradition of national or European remembrance and which try to utilize new strategic options. Their goal apparently is a globalization of politics of remembrance, in order to on the one hand gain new power of definition, and on the other to achieve new forms of political mobilizing.

These new formats are about memory politics with transnational images and in supranational formats – often with primarily civilizing and religious motives. They obviously are attempts to install after all "grand narratives" after the unsuccessful "End of History": new regimes of remembrance and imagery, which in their strategic intent aim at a new "global politics of remembrance". This at least is my first impression. – Yet, many of the following thoughts are so far only roughly worked out, and my arguments are elaborated only in a sketchily manner. Yet I want to try to outline two levels of such

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[7] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24.11. 2006, p. 37.

a global politics of remembrance. To me they seem to differ mainly with respect to which role "the European" plays in each of them. To begin with and on the first level there are the two terms of "world cultural heritage" and "genocide". – With this I want to follow hints about a European regime in the globalization of politics of remembrance. Then, on the second level, there are the crusades and the Turkish wars. – Here I want to follow up the idea of a new religious imagery as it becomes visible in the periphery of Islamism. This imagery to me seems to vice versa stand for a global regime of politics of remembrance.

I will start with the Europeanization of a global politics of remembrance. This tendency seems to become especially apparent with the UNESCO program of "World Heritage". As is generally known, this program is about a very successful and effective instrument of cultural politics, which was installed in 1972 and which is intended to implement global standards in memorial politics and politics of remembrance. The disputes ranging from Afghanistan (the destruction of two ancient statues by the Taliban) to Dresden (the idea of a new bridge crossing the river Elbe and the romantic site of Dresden) have caused almost even more sensation than the large number of successful projects. And they have thereby increased the program's significance.

Yet, it is not hard to quite accurately reconstruct how many of the program's underlying cultural ideas and concepts are geared to European cultural formats. From the materiality of the "Cultural Heritage concept (stone and brick)"[8] and from its artificial orientation and its aesthetic code to its conceptions of masterpieces of global culture – it is the European standards that predominate. Newer ideas such as that of a textual inventory, a so-called "Memory of the World Register", or of a media archive, the "Digital Heritage", reveal this conceptual origin as well. Only few marginal programs, which put a stronger focus on oral traditions in World Heritage or on cultural protection, indicate non-European handwritings.

Yet, most formats clearly revert to repertoires of the European heritage of the 18th and 19th century. As, for example, to the idea of the monument as symbol of national remembrance, or to that of the museum as site for the construction of identity; to the

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[8] Peter Strasser: Das kulturelle Erbe auf dem internationalen Parkett. Die UNESCO und der Schutz des kulturellen Erbes. In: Bricolage Vol. 3 (Kulturelles Erbe). Innsbruck 2005, pp. 52-77, here p. 66.

idea of the individual art genius, or to landscape as an open-air-archive of European "nature-culture" aesthetics. Such historical models are of course being updated correspondingly. But within the World Heritage program they are above all also generalized and universalized. So it is again monument and memory, artwork and landscape, thus: basic themes of a European iconography, which are supposed to attribute meaning to this securing and conserving of global culture.

European culture and European aesthetics as universal mode of thinking and practice – this is global culture politics with European power of definition. And this means – despite cosmopolitan intention – that non-European ideas of culture conversely are being blinded out or de-contextualized. Thus a central place of a "global politics of remembrance" is thereby taken in by the charge of a European cultural fundamentalism.

The second example for this "European" dominance and formatting is the discourse around the Turkish genocide against the Armenian minority in 1914/15 and the therewith-associated politics of remembrance. The way the Armenian side figures this was exemplary shown and enacted at the dedication ceremonies of the new genocide memorial in Jerewan two years ago. – We have intensely observed this campaign around ceremony and memorial in the context of a research project. Armenia hereby skillfully took advantage of the specific moment, and this in a twofold manner:
On the one hand, it has already for several years been intensively involved in European cultural programs. It has therefore aligned its politics of remembrance with the European cultural politics. On the other hand and at the same time it has come to realize which chances result from Turkey's present efforts for EU accession negotiations. Because it is the EU where a candid discussion about historical remembrance and guilt are being regarded as a crucial criterion for accession capability.

By means of preparative books and films, academic conferences and last but not least by means of the monumental inauguration of the memorial with almost one million participants, Armenia therefore pursues a "European" concept of remembrance politics

in the region.[9] This is based on the premise of public discourse, on a clear-cut correlation of victim and perpetrator, on the ethos of acknowledgement of guilt, and, finally, on the memorial as a territorial principle of remembrance. This Armenian memorial is thus supposed to take up a constant "lieu de mémoire" in that map of global sites of memorials. – In a map which was formed in Europe and which initially denoted only the sites of the Holocaust.

Turkey refuses this effort, due to its deliberate dislike of this Europeanization of memory politics. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, Turkey regards itself to be subjected to enough other European impositions in the run-up to the accession negotiations. – Impositions which would be hard to represent domestically. And, on the other hand, it is due to the fact that thereby its own, nationalistically penned project would get out of balance – out of a balance that besides remembrance especially includes forgetting. If Turkey would thus accept the ethnic Genocide against the Armenians as accusation of guilt, the danger would apparently be too high that this confession would be just the beginning of a more general ethnic opening of the "national question". And this would mean: official fragmentation of the nation's collective memory.

So far only a rough outline of the situation. – The Armenian strategy is comprehensible. And one may by far not share or accept the Turkish position. However, it reveals which difficulties can emerge when "external" regimes of interpretation intervene in still open and not yet fully negotiated processes of remembrance: politics of remembrance is being even more "culturalized".

III.
Finally, the second level, which seems to be even more important to me: the dramatic rise of "civilizational-religious" imagery in the global discourse of remembrance. What counts for "World Heritage" apparently counts for "the religious" in an exceptional way: Here, "grand narratives" are consciously being put to position again – much in the sense of the ideological concept of the "clash of civilizations". Currently this happens most impressively in that "iconoclastic" controversy, which is headed for an open confrontation between Christian-occidental and Islamist-oriental camp mentality.

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[9] Tsypylma Darieva / Wolfgang Kaschuba [eds.]: Representations on the Margins of Europe. Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States. Forthcoming 2007.

This certainly has several reasons. Firstly, this is related to a new Christian agenda in Europe and the U.S.: To contemporary reversions to alleged helpful value systems of the Western-occidental tradition. Secondly, it is related to a religiousness strengthened by its popular layout and influence, as it currently appears in the post-socialist societies of Poland and Hungary. – But also in the shape of the Christian Right in the U.S. or of respective movements in Asian and African societies. Thirdly and above all, however, this "religious turn" is being initiated by the new and offensive appearance of Islamist ideology and movement also in Europe. – This is especially what I want to think about a bit here.

It is currently obvious how intensively both Islamic as well as Christian cultural and religious fundamentalists aim at re-generating old figures of remembrance[10]: on the one hand that of the Muslim avenger on the "countries of the crusader coalition"; on the other hand the model of the Christian defender of Vienna in the 17th and 18th century against the Turks and Islam. In both the Muslim and the Christian camp there are being taken in fundamentalist positions, which very consciously construct an identity based on distinction. It is the sharpness of this difference by means of which each side apparently believes to regain the feeling of cultural authenticity and legitimacy. And in both cases this is consciously happening with a reciprocal reference: by the overreaching rejection of the European as well as vice versa by its overreaching idealization. Regarding the Islamists there is also the aggravating aspect of their condemnation and deprecation of Euro-Islam as "European" infected version of their religion.

Thus both fronts form up *by means of* a visual politics as well as *in* a visual politics. Hereby texts and arguments are being substituted by symbols and icons in a radical way: The "iconic-suggestive" displaces the "textual-argumentative" – at least its last remains. With rising speed of scheme and counter-scheme there is developing a dangerous spiral effect; because this iconoclastic controversy forces to take sides and to show commitment. And it leads to a pure iconization and aestheticization of collective memory: thus to a remembrance which is being regulated solely by the repertoire of

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[10] Thomas Meyer: Die Ironie Gottes: Religiotainment, Resakralisierung und die liberale Demokratie. Wiesbaden 2005.

imagery and by its iconography. It will then cease to be accessible to discursive arguments and reflexive considerations.

This situation dramatically aggravates last but not least because this "mnemopolitical war of religions" also takes place in the field of European (as well as global) politics of migration. It is there where since 9/11 migration is being announced as the dominant event in Europe and at the same time as its central threat. And this is not at all just the case in the sense of security policy. Rather, there has taken place a decided cultural reassessment of migration. In politics and media, migration is being defined more fiercely than ever before as the cause of a growing cultural foreignness: It is migration, which is said to be responsible for a new disruption of European societies as well as European cities. Especially the Arab, African and Turkish immigration is said to mean a cultural overloading of European national societies, since with it there often simultaneously comes a "foreign" religion.

This reasoning seems to be effective, even though factual immigration has actually decreased in most European countries considerably since years. And this even though the majority of people marked as "migrants" has long been born in Europe and has a European citizenship. Thus even though "European" by geographical origin, they are consciously ascribed a non-European identity: that of "foreign" ethnic origin and of "foreign" cultural belonging. In civil society as well as mnemopolitically this is a non-Identity; it is excluding and relegates the migrants to a geographical-cultural no man's land: to migration itself as a social space of transit.

Within European societies there is hereby being built a new external border, politically as well as symbolically. It is an imaginary border line around exclaves of "foreign" culture, around apparent "parallel societies" of migrants. And this border line is being fixated especially in a mnemopolitical way: by means of the open or tacit reference to "own" history, remembrance, and ethnicity – and on its insurmountable opposition to the "other".

This ethnic coding of belongingness, which aims at origin and lineage, reveals a clearly racist concept. – A concept which appears to become more and more dominant in the

present discourse on migration. Because this racism has already long reached the center of society – in Germany as well as in Britain, in Scandinavia as well as in Russia. Everywhere migration now apparently embodies the central projection screen for all those memories and feelings of insecurity, which have resulted from the economic crises and social disruption of the past years. And especially the European attention industry's media eagerly contribute to the production of such imagery of the "foreign" migrants.

At the latest since the New York City terror attacks there is spreading an equally handy as well as narrowly concluded chain of association, which puts migration and terrorism into a causal coherency. Which cites old images of the treacherous oriental. Which refuses to accept that the self-proclaimed "holy warriors" are usually no immigrated Al-Qaida but can already for a long time be regarded to as "homegrown terrorism". Which especially also ignores that the latter's motives originate to a large extent from "domestic" social conflicts in Europe. That their strategic concept and media structure have been developed in the shadow of mosques in London or Hamburg. And that the Suras of the Quran and the slogans of the jihad thereby only serve as "styles of reasoning" – as symbolic practice, and as ideological justification.

So: In the past years there have thus clearly been coming to the fore strategies of a systematic "collectivization" via religion. And these produce dramatic effects. On the one hand, the Islamist groups offer an own identity to those youth who are excluded as "foreign migrants": an identity as respected member of a community, which defines its own values. And which thereby distances itself from the hostile social majority. Herefore the Islamist concept of a "religious" memory provides catchy images as examples and role models: its numinous references to the Muslim trauma of the Christian crusades as well as to the iconic figure of the Muslim holy warrior. These are role models which to some young men appear to be the only ones really achievable: those of the convinced Muslim or even those of the historical revenger. – Also as a kind of symbolic "Self-Orientalization" against the European! For other models, as from the realm of civil society or simply that of consumer society, are often impossible for them to strive for on their own, due to lack of education.

On the other hand, this leads to a Christian-occidental fundamentalism feeling to be called upon to build up its cultural defense. Likewise this is so with the argument of incompatibility of cultural and religious precepts; and equally with reference to the imminent loss of own tradition, culture and authenticity. That is why there are forming up angry citizen's action committees in almost all European cities where new representative mosques are being built. They regard the future minarets as army flags of a foreign cultural infiltration. So they want to courageously defend "the occident" in their neighborhood. What is all going unnoticed in the iconoclastic controversy is that Muslim communities are culturally coming closer to us with such mosques – that their religious spaces and rituals are actually becoming more transparent.

What is also noticeable, in any case, is how fast the Christian crusades to Jerusalem and the defense of Vienna in the so-called Turkish Wars have become subject of popular interest. Crusaders and holy warriors, Turkish janizary and defender of Vienna are being portrayed in a sudden multiplicity of publications. And they are thereby simultaneously being represented as twin types of history of civilization. – On both sides of course in opposed, yet interchangeable attributes: Hero and believer on one side, child murderer and rapist on the other. These figures are iconographically present and passed on (even the image of the Turkish knifer is a late version of the sabering janizary). But these images have only been weakly outlined in collective memory – especially not for their present carriers. Therefore, much had to be renewed to get things going, pulled out of context, also made up anew, in order to then be "remembered".

That way emerges: "community of remembrance". Because through this invention of remembrance one is becoming a carrier of knowledge and truth. – An alleged absolute truth, which thereby becomes a social movement. Religious iconography therefore seems to be very well suited for a media of group identity. Because in relation to national and social remembrance "religiously" impregnated memories are apparently much less subjected to the process of reflection. Integrated in religious practices and rituals, their imagery is hard to question and to discuss. All the more, however, they allow for an emotionalization and mobilization. This still even applies in a sense to the secularized Christian churches in Germany. And it applies all the more when the religious carrying culture is as much tied up in politics of difference, as much localistic

and communitarian as fundamentalist Islamic and Christian parishes. – The only true belief, the preacher who is responsible only to the perish and the sectarian traits in church life: this is to be found in the shadow of Berlin backyard-mosques as well as at the Christian foot of the Rocky Mountains.[11]

The media setting of this religious politics of remembrance certainly stands in an explicit contrast to the archaic appearing messages. "Religious" video clips and films, infotainment and Internet databases, chats and games are "normal". Since long there are circulating Islamist "history videos", in which crusaders are fighting with holy warriors, added by fantasy motives and pop music. With respect to their "pathetic" texture they still absolutely resemble the national memorial inaugurations of the German Empire. In their media impact and imagery, however, they function as postmodern communication and aesthetics.

And this tells much about the agents as well as about the audience: Many of the "believers" are culturally just as much late modern "users" and "players". They ask "Islamonline" for advice, how to pray and how to kiss – not the mullah! So: Talk about the Islamists' "stone age religiousness" often prevents us from this important realization. And the icons of remembrance have long ago also been transformed into "toys" – into high quality and effective counters in the game. Therewith they spread via the Internet as well as via oral communication. And they are thereby becoming especially accessible and attractive for kids and teenagers.

Even that Muslim and Christian religious fundamentalism, which considers itself as "pure doctrine", is already for a long time a "hybrid" culture. And what can arise from this hybrid mixture of iconic images, of cultural fundamentalism, of religious memory politics, and of the World Wide Web has last but not least been demonstrated in the case of the Mohammed caricatures. – In any case, here the Danish cultural fundamentalists evidently have underestimated the Islamist religious fundamentalists.

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[11] Wolfgang Kaschuba: Ethnische Parallelgesellschaften? Zur kulturellen Konstruktion des Fremden in der europäischen Migration. In: Zeitschrift für Volkskunde, 1 / 2007, pp. 65-85.

My short summary: In these phenomena we can apparently observe a new "memory management". – A memory management which operates globally by new regimes and with new media and formats. Already long this management has ceased to be only controlled by the regulative triangle Western Europe – Israel – USA. Rather, Arab, African, and Asian agents meanwhile play along at a key level: In the shape of media such as Al-Jazeera, political religious activist groups and NGOs, up to political parties and national governments. Thereby the screenplays of historical memories are being rewritten quicker and quicker – in order to change roles and to sharpen them often aggressively. Thus we see: Anti-Semitisms among French teenagers with Arab migratory background, fundamentalist positions of European as well as American Christians, European Islamists' hate against Europe, nationalisms of Eastern European Post-socialists, racisms in Western European middle-class milieus…

In the meantime the message of this memory politics is only partly directed towards national societies or local minorities. Rather it now increasingly aims at groups that are being held together by means of worldviews of most different kinds, but that often live globally scattered. No matter whether they refer to linguistic, ethnic, or religious mutuality: It is "iconic" images and "aesthetic" formats that control these feelings of belonging.

This is why this memory-management often doesn't hold an actual center any more – as in the classical shape of controlling social organizations or elites. Rather it is organized more like a network or campaign. And it intensively integrates the possibilities of global communication, such as the Internet, visual media, and infotainment. Memory is thereby simultaneously being carried into new "culturalistic terms" , which then also enable new political and ideological implementations.

There are five strategies that thereby seem to be crucial to me: Memory is, firstly, being "de-contextualized". It is being detached from previous interpretative contexts of remembrance in order to achieve new effects. And it is simultaneously and directly being combined with patterns of practice: thus oriented towards instantaneous appliance. Secondly, memory is spatially being released. It is being "de-spatialized", thus being removed from its stable place in the memory landscape of the "lieux de mémoire" and carried to new, often media spaces of remembrance. Thirdly,

remembering is being "moralized" in a new form. As in the case of religion it is being charged with moral-ethical meanings, which notably emotionalizes and mobilizes: in a new mytho-motoric quality. Thereby the circle of the "community of remembrance" is being enlarged and simultaneously strengthened. Fourthly, from this also results a "globalization" of figures of remembrance. As previously only in the singular case of the Holocaust, there are thereby produced new representatives of a "global memory politics". And fifthly, these figures are thereby successfully and increasingly being "fundamentalized". Remembrance is being forged as icon: It is being de-textualized and isolated, symbolically dramatized as image and made absolute in its validity. – This is what I mean with "Iconic Remembering".